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A BUDDING THEORY OF WILLFUL PATENT
INFRINGEMENT: ORANGE BOOKS, COLORED
PILLS, AND GREENER VERDICTS
CHRISTOPHER A. HARKINS 1

ABSTRACT
The rules of engagement in the brand-name versus genericdrug war are rapidly changing. Brand-name manufacturers face
increasing competition from Canadian manufacturers of generic
drugs, online drug companies, and Wal-Mart® Super Centers
deciding to cash in by turning a piece of the generic prescription
drug business into a huge marketing campaign with offerings of
generic drugs for four dollar prescriptions. Other discount drug
providers are likely to follow suit in hopes of boosting customer
traffic and sales of their generic drugs. Now, more than ever
before, attorneys representing owners of pharmaceutical patents
need to be creative with their damages theories to maximize
recovery and help their clients recoup the investments in
research and development necessary to bring new and
innovative drugs to the marketplace. This article suggests a
novel theory of willful infringement to assist a patent owner in
recovering treble damages and attorneys’ fees.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Allegations of willful patent infringement frequently take center
stage in patent litigation, offering treble damages 2 and attorneys’ fees 3 to
patent owners eager to turn actual damages into a windfall. From a
patent owner’s perspective, the possibility of recovering treble damages
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35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (A “court may increase the damages up to three times
the amount found or assessed.”).
3
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party.”).
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and attorneys’ fees may tip the scales in favor of enforcing its patent in
an infringement lawsuit.
¶2
Do allegations of willfulness apply with equal force, or even
apply at all, in the context of brand-name versus generic-drug litigation?
The answer may depend on whether a party finds itself enforcing patents
or defending against them. While patent owners attempted to assert
willfulness allegations, generic-drug companies argued with some
success that willfulness damages should not apply under the complex and
conflicting wording of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 4

More than two decades ago, Congress passed the HatchWaxman Act, which allowed generic-drug companies to obtain approval
by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to market generic drugs
that were therapeutically equivalent to previously-approved drugs of
brand-name manufacturers shown to be safe and effective. According to
the approval process under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the generic company
could rely on the safety and efficacy data submitted by the brand-name
manufacturer to the FDA, which greatly expedited the approval process
for generic companies. 5 The authoritative reference for FDA-approved
drugs, and any patents listed as covering those drugs, is referred to as the
“Orange Book.” 6

¶3

¶4
Since the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, brand-name
pharmaceutical companies and their generic competitors have clashed in
courts, with each party simultaneously asserting different legal strategies
in an attempt to leverage benefits provided them in the intricate and
oftentimes contradictory language of the legislation. But, patent owners
litigating in the hotly contested fights involving patent-protected
pharmaceuticals and generic drugs failed to consider the “Orange Book”
as a tool for pleading constructive notice of a patent and thereby
acquiring an earlier date from which actual damages accrue—even

4

The Hatch-Waxman Act was passed in 1984. The Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified
as 21 U.S.C. § 355 et seq. (2006), 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006), and 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e) (2006)).
5
Brand-name manufacturers may also seek approval under this abbreviated
process set forth in the Hatch-Waxman Act.
6
The Orange Book includes certain information provided by the brand-name
manufacturer, who is required to list all patent numbers and expiration dates for
“any patent which claims the drug for which the applicant submitted the
application or which claims a method of using such drug and with respect to
which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person
not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006).
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though generic-drug manufacturers are obliged to consult the Orange
Book. Furthermore, patent owners overlooked the potential for pleading
the Orange Book as a basis of showing actual notice of a patent and, as a
consequence, possibly proving an intentional violation of the statutory
duty to consult the Orange Book, objectively reckless disregard of
standards of commercial behavior under the Hatch-Waxman Act
requiring a reasonable respect for the intellectual property rights listed in
the Orange Book, and ultimately a case of willful infringement.
¶5
Willfulness based on Orange Book notice of a patent is no
ordinary theory. Rather, this theory is one of first impression with a
proverbial clean slate on which creative theories may be written. In its
much-anticipated recent en banc decision on willful infringement, 7 the
Federal Circuit endorsed the view that left to district courts the
opportunity to develop 8 the law that governs the evidence necessary to
prove willful infringement, and cited as one factor the “standards of
commerce.” 9 In the same decision, Circuit Judge Newman observed:
“Industrial innovation would falter without the order that patent property
contributes to the complexities of investment in technologic R & D and
commercialization in a competitive marketplace. The loser would be not
only the public, but also the nation’s economic vigor.” 10
¶6
Without binding law to the contrary, and with support from this
recent Federal Circuit decision, the possibility of pleading a new theory
is appealing to lawyers serving clients who understandably want to
maximize patent damages. After all, today’s patent damages may help to
offset current operating expenses, underwrite tomorrow’s research
budget, and add to future innovations for pioneering drugs.
¶7
Never in the history of pharmaceutical patent litigation has the
need for treble damages and attorneys’ fees mattered as much as now.
The 2007 survey published by the American Intellectual Property Law
Association affirms what patent owners and attorneys knew all along:
patent litigation is expensive. 11 Particularly when actual damages might
7

In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
Id. at 1371, 1385.
9
Id. at 1371 n.5.
10
Id. at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring).
11
The Law Practice Management Committee of the American Intellectual
Property Law Association (AIPLA) conducts an economic survey every two
years relating to, among other things, the costs of patent litigation. The most
recent survey from July 2007 found that attorneys’ fees could top $600,000
when $1 million is at stake, while those fees could top $2.5 million and even top
$5.0 million when the damages at issue are in excess of $1 million and $25
million, respectively. American Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, REPORT OF THE
8
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be low, the possibility of treble damages and attorneys’ fees is critical to
a plaintiff’s competitive edge. 12 Indeed, the cost of patent litigation
drives pharmaceutical clients to demand agility from their patent counsel
with creative legal pleading and an ability to introduce theories for
augmenting recovery.
¶8
Will plaintiffs’ attorneys nourish the emerging theories based on
using the “Orange Book” to prove both notice of a patent and objective
recklessness for purposes of actual damages and willfulness? Or will
defense attorneys successfully quash such novel notice theories before
the Federal Circuit?
¶9
Section I provides a background discussion on the law of willful
infringement. Section II explores the statutory and regulatory schemes
under which the Orange Book was created and became law pursuant to
the Hatch-Waxman Act. Also, Section II constructs an analysis that
might prove useful in asserting, or defending against, allegations that the
Orange Book satisfies the notice requirement under the marking statute,
notice sufficient to trigger willful infringement, and objective
recklessness based on the deliberate failure to comply with a statutory
duty or standards of fair commerce. Section III offers suggestions of
how the novel Orange Book theory would apply to lawsuits brought
under the Hatch-Waxman Act or traditional infringement actions.

I. WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT AND PATENT DAMAGES
¶10
In order to understand the risks of treble damages and attorneys’
fees that may be awarded based on a finding of willfulness, one must
understand the different ways a defendant may receive “notice” of an
asserted patent. Indeed, the Federal Circuit draws a significant

ECONOMIC SURVEY 25–26 (2007). For an analysis of the rising costs of patent
litigation, see Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent
Trolls: A Novel “Cold Fusion” Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 407, 434–38 (2007) (discussing an AIPLA survey and
arguing how costs of litigation are used by patent trolls asserting paper patents
to extort a nuisance settlement, thereby resulting in social harm and crippling
innovation; introducing a defense to combat paper patents and patent trolls, id. at
453–77); see also View Eng’g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d 981,
986 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“A patent suit can be an expensive proposition.”).
12
For simplicity, the term “plaintiff” refers to patent owners suing for patent
infringement or defending against a declaratory judgment action based on their
cease-and-desist letter. The term “defendant” refers to a party accused of patent
infringement and who is either being sued for patent infringement or is bringing
a declaratory judgment action for non-infringement.
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distinction between notice for purposes of proving simple infringement 13
and recovering actual damages on the one hand, compared to notice for
purposes of proving willful infringement and recovering enhanced
damages on the other. 14 Generally stated, actual damages are decreased
when notice fails to meet the requirements of the marking statute under
Section 287(a), 15 while enhanced damages are denied when, under the
totality-of-circumstances test, the defendant did not have notice
sufficient to trigger a duty to investigate and avoid willful infringement.
¶11
In this section, Part A sets forth an overview of the totality of
circumstances considered in assessing whether infringement was willful.
Part B provides an analytical framework of the types of notice that courts
recognized as invoking a defendant’s duty to avoid willfully infringing a
patent. Part C concludes this section with a discussion of the ways a
plaintiff may prove notice in order to recover actual damages.

A. Willful Infringement and the “Totality of Circumstances”
While innocent parties may be liable for patent infringement, 16
willful infringement does not lie based on “the simple fact of
infringement.” 17 Instead, it requires culpability on the part of the

¶12

13

See infra note 16 and accompanying text (Strict liability for patent
infringement does not depend on negligence or intent to harm, but is actionable
simply based on the fact that an accused product or method infringes a patented
invention).
14
See supra notes 2–3 (Remedies for willful infringement are founded on § 284
and § 285); see also Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana
Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
15
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006).
16
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(“Because patent infringement is a strict liability offense, the nature of the
offense is only relevant in determining whether enhanced damages are
warranted.”); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512,
1527 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“[I]ntent is not an element of direct
infringement, whether literal or by equivalents . . . Infringement is, and should
remain, a strict liability offense.”).
17
Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“There
is no evidentiary presumption that every infringement is willful.”).
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infringer. 18 Therefore, a finding of actual infringement is necessary but
not sufficient to satisfy willfulness, which is a question of fact. 19
1. A Brief Historical Perspective of Willfulness Prior
to the Federal Circuit’s Seagate Technology
Decision
¶13
According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
its 2004 decision in Knorr-Bremse, the duty to avoid infringing a known
patent is fundamental to determining willful infringement. 20 Until
recently, there was 24-year precedent, in Underwater Devices, Inc. v.
Morrison-Knudsen Co., 21 for the proposition that, where “a potential
infringer has actual notice of another’s patent rights, he has an
affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is
infringing.” 22

While Underwater Devices was cited as good law in the Federal
Circuit’s Knorr-Bremse 23 decision in 2004, and even EchoStar 24 in 2006,
the Federal Circuit’s 2007 decision, In re Seagate Technology, LLC,
overruled the duty of “due care” as too akin to a negligence-like state of
mind as shown in the next subpart. 25 However, the Federal Circuit in

¶14

18

Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342; see also Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1385
(Newman, J., concurring) (“The fundamental issue remains the reasonableness,
or in turn the culpability, of commercial behavior that violates legally protected
property rights.”).
19
Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
20
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345 (“[T]here continues to be ‘an affirmative
duty of due care to avoid infringement of the known patent rights of others.’”)
(citation omitted).
21
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
22
Id.
23
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343.
24
In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see
also id. at 1302 n.4 (“noting that an infringer may continue its infringement after
notification of the patent by filing suit and that the infringer has a duty of due
care to avoid infringement after such notification”) (citing Crystal
Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336,
1351–53 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
25
Christopher A. Harkins, Choosing Between the Advice of Counsel Defense to
Willful Patent Infringement or the Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel: A
Bridge or the Troubled Waters?, 5 NORTHWESTERN J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
210, 229–33 (2007) (arguing that Underwater Devices and EchoStar have set off
a veritable feeding frenzy against defendants who rely on the opinion of counsel

6
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Seagate Technology reaffirmed 26 “willfulness” as the standard for
enhanced damages to be evaluated under the “totality of circumstances”
discussed below.
At trial, there must be a finding of actual infringement, and then
a separate determination by the fact finder of whether the defendant’s
infringement was willful. 27 In reaching its decision, the fact finder
considers the “totality of circumstances,” 28 which include the following
factors:
¶15

(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of
another; (2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s
patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a
good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; (3)
the infringer’s behavior as a party to the litigation; (4) defendant’s
size and financial condition; (5) closeness of the case; (6) duration
of defendant’s misconduct; (7) remedial action by the defendant; (8)
defendant’s motivation for harm; and (9) whether defendant
attempted to conceal its misconduct. 29

defense, whereby some courts are putting defendants to a Hobson’s choice of
asserting that defense in order to stave off enhanced damages on the one hand,
and waiving all privileged communications—even with trial counsel itself—on
the other), cited in H.R. Rep. No. 110-314, at 28 nn.15 & 18 (Sept. 4, 2007)
(The “Patent Reform Act of 2007” is pending in the Senate for consideration
and is available at http://www.rules.house.gov/110/text/110_hr1908rpt.pdf (last
visited October 4, 2007)).
26
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(“This well-established standard accords with Supreme Court precedent.”); see
also id. at 1369 (“Over time, our cases evolved to evaluate willfulness . . . under
the totality of circumstances.”); id. at 1377 (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (“[T]his
court has nevertheless read a willfulness standard into the statute.”). Judge
Gajarsa wrote separately in a concurring opinion to restore the flexibility of the
remedial nature of 35 U.S.C. § 284 such that “a discretionary enhancement of
damages would be appropriate for entirely remedial reasons, irrespective of the
defendant’s state of mind.” Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1378 (Gajarsa, J.,
concurring).
27
Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(“The drawing of inferences, particularly in respect of an intent-implicating
question such as willfulness, is peculiarly within the province of the fact finder
that observed the witnesses.”) (citation omitted).
28
Liquid Dynamics., 449 F.3d at 1225; see also Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz
Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
29
Liquid Dynamics, 449 F.3d at 1225 (citation, ellipsis, and internal quotation
marks omitted).
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The plaintiff must prove willfulness by clear and convincing
evidence. 30 Once the plaintiff meets its burden of persuasion and burden
of production as to willfulness, 31 the burden of production shifts to the
defendant to introduce evidence to rebut plaintiff’s showing that the
defendant acted with objective recklessness. 32 An express finding of
willfulness is necessary before the second step. 33
¶16

¶17
Second, the court exercises its discretion in determining whether
to increase the damage award based on the fact finder’s determination of
willfulness. 34 An “express finding of willful infringement” 35 merely
authorizes—it does not mandate—treble damages and attorneys’ fees. 36
The paramount factor in deciding to grant enhanced damages, and the
amount of those damages, is the defendant’s culpable conduct or bad
faith. In assessing the state of mind of a defendant who the fact finder
decides to have infringed a patent willfully, courts consider many factors
in addition to the totality of the circumstances listed above. 37 These
30

Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371 (“Accordingly, to establish willful
infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence” objective
recklessness); nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1319 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (“A jury verdict of willfulness requires a finding ‘by clear and
convincing evidence in view of the totality of the circumstances that [the
defendant] acted in disregard of the . . . patent and lacked a reasonable basis for
believing it had a right to do what it did.’”) (quoting Amsted Indus., Inc. v.
Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 181 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
31
Comark Commc’ns, 156 F.3d at 1190.
32
Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“[A]bsent an initial presentation of evidence . . . this burden of coming forward
in defense [does] not arise.”).
33
Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 407 F.3d 1297, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
2005). An express finding of willful infringement is necessary before the court
awards enhanced damages. Id.
34
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(“Trial courts have had statutory discretion to enhance damages for patent
infringement since 1836.”); Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438
F.3d 1354, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Any trebling of damages based on a finding
of willfulness is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”).
35
Group One, 407 F.3d at 1308–09 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (When the court exercises
its discretion in denying willfulness damages, it must explain why.) (citation
omitted).
36
Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1368 (“But, a finding of willfulness does not
require an award of enhanced damages; it merely permits it.”); Group One, 407
F.3d at 1309 (On a jury finding of willful patent infringement, a “court may
award attorney fees and not enhanced damages, or vice versa.”).
37
See supra Part I.A.1 and notes 28–29 (identifying the factors that comprise the
“totality of circumstances”); see also Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co.,
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additional factors include evidence of whether the defendant took (or
failed to take) reasonable steps to design around the patent to avoid
infringement, 38 evidence of whether (and to what extent) the defendant
simply copied the patented invention, 39 and evidence offered by the
defendant that it obtained and relied on the advice of counsel when the
defendant decided to continue sales of the accused product. 40
¶18
In short, when the defendant knows of the patent and fails to
carry out its duty to avoid infringing a valid and enforceable patent, a
court may find willful infringement provided the defendant was more
than merely negligent. As a result, the plaintiff may be entitled to treble
damages as well as attorneys’ fees, 41 and such an award in patent
litigation can be “punitive.” 42

2. Seagate Technology Permits a Finding of
Willfulness Based on a Showing of “Objective
Recklessness”
¶19
The Federal Circuit, in its en banc decision in In re Seagate
Technology, LLC, 43 addressed the issue of whether, given the “impact”

449 F.3d 1209, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“A finding of willful infringement is
made after considering the totality of the circumstances.”).
38
Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that failure to attempt to design around the patent may
justify enhanced damages).
39
Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics Inc., 96 F.3d 1409, 1414 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (holding no need to find “slavish copying” if copying was made
“deliberately”); Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
40
Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding that
a court may consider evidence that the defendant obtained an opinion of counsel
of whether the accused product infringes any valid, enforceable claim of the
patent.); but see In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(en banc) (“Because we abandon the affirmative duty of due care, we also
reemphasize that there is no affirmative obligation to obtain opinion of
counsel.”).
41
See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (“The court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”).
42
Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1370 (characterizing enhanced damages as
“punitive damages”); see also Glenayre Elecs., Inc. v. Jackson, 443 F.3d 851,
869 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (characterizing as possibly “punitive” the increased
damages under the statute’s trebling provision in a case of willful infringement);
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
43
497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
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of Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 44 the Court
should reconsider that decision and the “duty of care standard itself.” 45
The Federal Circuit overruled the standard of “due care” set forth in
Underwater Devices and adopted an “objective recklessness” standard. 46
¶20
One cannot deny that the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in
Seagate Technology raised the bar on the standard of proof necessary to
establish willful infringement. While “due care” appeared simple
enough, it could lead to a misapplication of the willfulness standard. If
misapplied, a defendant could be found liable for enhanced damages by
merely failing to act with “reasonable care,” 47 which lowered the
willfulness standard to one more akin to negligence. According to the
court, the reasonable care “standard fails to comport with the general
understanding of willfulness in the civil context, and it allows punitive
damages in a manner inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.” 48
¶21
The Federal Circuit in Seagate Technology took a common-sense
approach by ridding patent jurisprudence of law allowing enhanced
damages under the “due care” standard specifically, but without
discarding all other well-developed law on willfulness and the totality of
circumstances in general. It follows that, at its core, Seagate Technology
was not taking patent jurisprudence back to the days “when widespread
disregard of patent rights was undermining the national innovation
incentive” 49 and no license was given to a defendant’s “bad faith”
infringement. 50
¶22
So, the Federal Circuit replaced the lower “due care” threshold
required for proving willful infringement with a higher threshold that
required at least a showing of “objective recklessness.” 51 The new
standard has both an objective aspect and a quasi-subjective one:

Accordingly, to establish willful infringement, a patentee must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted
44

717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1397.
46
Id. at 1371.
47
Id. at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring).
48
Id. at 1371 (citation omitted).
49
Id. at 1369 (citing Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana
Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc)).
50
Id. at 1368; see also id. at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring) (“It cannot be the
court’s intention to tolerate the intentional disregard or destruction of the value
of the property of another, simply because that property is a patent.”).
51
Id. at 1371 (“[W]e abandon the affirmative duty of due care . . . .”).
45
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infringement of a valid patent. The state of mind of the accused
infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry. If this threshold
objective standard is satisfied, the patentee must also demonstrate
that this objectively-defined risk (determined by the record
developed in the infringement proceeding) was either known or so
obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer. 52
¶23
The Federal Circuit chose not to spell out precisely the meaning
of the new standard under the two-prong test quoted above. 53 Rather, the
Federal Circuit “left it to future cases to further develop.” 54
¶24
Hence, trial courts remain free to exercise their discretion and to
consider unique circumstances showing, by clear and convincing
evidence, a high likelihood that a defendant’s acts—or omissions—were
objectively unreasonable and, in turn, subjectively or at least objectively
culpable. It is on this theory that, when a defendant plays ostrich, it may
be held to have acted with objective recklessness: To know, and to want
not to know because one suspects infringement, may be, if not the same
state of mind, the same degree of fault.

B. “Notice” that Triggers a Defendant’s Duty to Avoid Willful
Infringement
¶25
When a company becomes aware of a patent that may be
relevant to its products and should realize there is a high likelihood of
infringement, it has an affirmative duty to avoid infringement. 55 In
practical application, a test of when this duty arises depends on the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding the position of the person

52

Id. at 1371 (citation omitted). In his concurring opinion, Judge Gajarsa reads
the court’s test as requiring “clear and convincing evidence, (1) that
[defendant’s] theory of noninfringement/invalidity, was not only incorrect, but
was objectively unreasonable, and (2) that [defendant] ran a risk of infringing
[plaintiff’s] patents substantially greater than the risk associated with a theory of
noninfringement/invalidity that was merely careless.” Id. at 1384.
53
Id. at 1371 (“We fully recognize that ‘the term [reckless] is not selfdefining.’” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994))).
54
Id. at 1371; see also id. at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring) (“Although new
uncertainties are introduced by the court’s evocation of ‘objected standards’ for
such inherently subjective criteria as ‘recklessness’ and ‘reasonableness,’ I trust
that judicial wisdom will come to show the way, in the common-law tradition.”).
55
Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the evenhanded recklessness standard
modified the “duty” by making clear that objective standards of conduct do not
require “that every possibly related patent must be exhaustively studied by
expensive legal talent.” In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1385 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Newman, J., concurring).
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who received notice of the patent, how that person received notice of the
patent, a record showing objectively reckless disregard of such notice,
and the mindset of the person when he or she received the notice and
chose to act or not act.
¶26
This duty arises when the defendant received “actual notice of
another’s patent,” 56 coupled with objective evidence that infringement
was highly likely and the defendant knew or should have recognized the
infringement risks. 57 At that moment, there arises an affirmative duty to
investigate whether any claim of the patent is being infringed. Notice of
the patent may come in the form of a complaint alleging patent
infringement, 58 in the form of a cease-and-desist letter, 59 or in a letter
offering to license the patent. 60
¶27
However, at least one court held that notice occurred when inhouse counsel merely saw a patent that was referenced in the Official
56

See supra Part I.A.1; see also nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d
1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
57
This “duty to avoid infringement” as used herein is consistent with the Federal
Circuit decision in Seagate Technology. The Federal Circuit could not possibly
have meant, in adopting the “objective recklessness” test, “to ratify intentional
disregard, and to reject objective standards requiring a reasonable respect for
property rights.” Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring). To
vitiate any duty to avoid infringement—when there is objective evidence of
reckless disregard for the risks of infringement—would unwittingly encourage
an unscrupulous defendant, in ostrich-like fashion, to seek cover in the sand so
as to disavow any specific knowledge of infringement.
58
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006) (“Filing of an action for infringement
shall constitute such notice.”); State Indus. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226,
1235–36 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (reversing the finding of willful infringement where
the complaint was filed just twenty-two days after the asserted patent had issued
and there was no clear evidence that the defendant copied the patented
invention).
59
Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(affirming the district court’s finding that infringement was willful based on
Wal-Mart’s failure to take appropriate action after receiving the patent owner’s
cease-and-desist letter—even if most sales were made prior to receiving the
letter, there was evidence that Wal-Mart continued to sell off its remaining
inventory after it learned of its possible infringement).
60
Evidence supported a determination that infringement was willful when the
infringer had actual notice of plaintiff’s patent rights before the infringement
began, when the notice was by letter offering a license under the patent before
any infringement took place, and defendant chose to proceed without a license.
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1384 (Fed.
Cir. 1983), rev’d in part on other grounds, Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
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Gazette of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 61 While the
defendant argued that it had not recognized the alleged infringement
risks posed by its product, the Federal Circuit gave weight to the fact that
in-house counsel associated the patent with the accused product in their
capacity as counsel for the potential infringer. 62
¶28
Another court found a potential infringer to be on notice when
the asserted patent was cited by the potential infringer in an information
disclosure statement, 63 even though the patent application had no direct
relationship with the allegedly infringing product.64 According to the
defendant, in order to trigger the alleged infringer’s duty to avoid
infringement “in the face of knowledge about the patent, the patent
owner must show that the accused infringer both knew about the patent
and understood that the patent raised a potential infringement
problem.” 65 The court found the defendant’s argument “that actual notice
requires both knowledge of the patent and knowledge of the potential for
infringement to be unpersuasive.” 66
¶29
These cases seem to be converting the notice standard from a
question asking what the potential infringer “had known” into a question
asking what the defendant “should have known.” As district courts
struggle over the appropriate question to ask in applying the notice
standard for purposes of willful infringement—once the “threshold
objective standard is satisfied,” 67 the Federal Circuit has simply said that
there must be something more than mere “constructive notice” 68 to
trigger the duty to avoid infringement and evidence that the objectively-

61

Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics Inc., 96 F.3d 1409, 1415 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
62
Id. at 1415–16.
63
37 C.F.R. §§ 1.97, 1.98 (2006).
64
Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1008,
1037 (D. Del. 2001), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 370 F.3d
1131 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
65
Id. at 1037.
66
Id. (finding that notice was sufficient to send the issue to the jury, because
there was a memorandum in the defendant’s files making reference to the patent
citing it to the PTO in an application that in-house counsel was prosecuting).
67
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
68
Imonex Services, Inc., v. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GMBH, 408 F.3d
1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Constructive notice, as by marking a product with
a patent number, is insufficient to trigger this duty.”).
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defined risk was “known or so obvious that it should have been
known.” 69
¶30
Indeed, the Federal Circuit held that a potential infringer’s duty
may be triggered by notice received by any corporate employee,
including engineers. 70 In other words, a defendant who intentionally
blinds itself to the facts and law, and then continues to infringe, may be
found to be a willful infringer by imputing 71 the state of mind of
employees to the state of mind of the defendant. 72
¶31
Therefore, one potential consequence of a defendant who has
notice of the patent, but who ignores an objectively high risk of
infringement, is being held liable for treble damages. 73 The trebling is of
all actual damages, which is addressed next.

C. “Notice” that Triggers a Plaintiff’s Actual Damages
¶32
By statute, a plaintiff may only recover actual damages accruing
after the date it placed the alleged infringer on notice of infringement. 74
69

Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371.
SRI Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(finding actual notice when defendant’s “engineers [had] expressed their
concerns” about the patent in a memorandum).
71
“Under the general common law of agency, ‘[e]xcept where the agent is
acting adversely to the principal . . . the principal is affected by the knowledge
which an agent has a duty to disclose to the principal . . . to the same extent as if
the principal had the information.’” Long Island Sav. Bank v. U.S., 476 F.3d
917, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 275 (1958)
and the copyright case Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 751–52 (1989) (relying on the Restatement in determining whether the
hired party was an employee or independent contractor for Copyright Act
purposes)). For a discussion of Reid, see Christopher A. Harkins, Tattoos and
Copyright Infringement: Celebrities, Marketers, and Businesses Beware of the
Ink, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 313, 324–26 (2006).
72
Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
73
Another potential consequence is attorneys’ fees, which are based on detailed
attorney timesheets, detailed billing statements and invoices showing actual
charges billed to the client in connection with the representation, evidence that
expenses were both reasonable and necessary in the normal course of attorney
services, evidence of the customary attorney rates in the relevant legal
community for handling patent litigation, and any premium in attorneys’ rates
based on skill and experience. Junker v. Eddings, 396 F.3d 1359, 1365–66 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
74
35 U.S.C. § 287(a)–(b) (2006); see also Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng’g Corp.,
6 F.3d 1523, 1537 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Section 287(a) requires a party
asserting infringement to either provide constructive notice (through marking) or
actual notice to avail itself of damages. The notice of infringement must
70
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Here, the notice for purposes of willfulness and the notice for actual
damages deviate.
¶33
While willfulness focuses on the time when the potential
infringer possessed knowledge of the patent and facts sufficient to
establish an objectively high likelihood of infringement, the notice
requirement for actual damages under § 287(a) focuses on the conduct of
the plaintiff and asks the questions of when the plaintiff gave the
defendant notice of the patent and accused the defendant of patent
infringement. 75 Consequently, for actual damages to accrue, mere
“notice of the patent’s existence or ownership” is not “notice of
infringement” and is not an “affirmative communication [to the potential
infringer] of a specific charge of infringement by a specific accused
product or device.” 76

In contrast to willfulness, the plaintiff may meet its burden of
proving notice under § 287(a) by giving the potential defendant
“constructive” notice, 77 such as when the plaintiff and its licensees mark
products with patent numbers that cover those products. 78 Moreover, the
¶34

therefore come from the patentee, not the infringer.”); Amsted Indus. Inc. v.
Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir.1994) (“For purposes of
section 287(a), notice must be of ‘the infringement,’ not merely notice of the
patent’s existence or ownership.”).
75
Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing SRI
Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also
Amsted Indus., 24 F.3d at 187 (“The correct approach to determining notice
under section 287 must focus on the action of the patentee, not the knowledge of
the infringer.”).
76
Amsted Indus., 24 F.3d at 187.
77
Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Delta Cotton Coop. Inc., 457 F.3d 1269, 1276 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (recovering damages for patent infringement requires a plaintiff to
prove “either actual or constructive notice” to the defendant of plaintiff’s
patent); Sentry Protection Prods., Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 918
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Constructive notice is provided when the patentee
consistently marks substantially all of its patented products.”) (internal citation
and brackets omitted); Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1111 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (A plaintiff “is entitled to damages from the time when it either began
marking its product in compliance with section 287(a), constructive notice, or
when it actually notified the accused infringer of its infringement, whichever
was earlier.”) (internal citation and brackets omitted).
78
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006) (“Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale,
or selling within the United States any patented article for or under them or
importing any patented article into the United States, may give notice to the
public that the same is patented, either by fixing thereon the word ‘patent’ or the
abbreviation ‘pat.’, together with the number of the patent, or when, from the
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Federal Circuit held that, to rely on the constructive-notice provisions of
§ 287(a), full compliance with that section requires the patentee to
“consistently mark[] substantially all of its patented products.” 79
Absent marking, the plaintiff cannot prove constructive notice or
recover actual damages for any period of time prior to the date when the
defendant received actual notice of the patent. In that case, actual
damages may be recovered, if at all, only from the date on which actual
notice was given by the plaintiff 80 to the defendant. Actual notice may
come in the form of the plaintiff filing a lawsuit or sending a letter to the
defendant accusing it of infringing the plaintiff’s patent. 81
¶35

¶36
Therefore, in some respects, willfulness has a more lenient
“notice” requirement than the notice requirement under § 287(a). As a
result, the willfulness clock may start to run long before the plaintiff ever
informs the defendant, by letter or complaint for patent infringement, that
the accused product infringes the asserted patent. The upshot of an early
date for willfulness is to put the defendant at risk that all damages will be
trebled and that a defendant may owe attorneys’ fees from the onset of
the litigation forward.
¶37
To further place the “notice” standard for willfulness in context,
it should be noted that the actual notice required under § 287(a) is even
lower than the standard necessary to support declaratory judgment
jurisdiction. 82 Moreover, the Federal Circuit recently lowered the
requirements necessary to establish an actual controversy under the
Declaratory Judgment Act for patent cases in general, 83 and for a patentrelated declaratory judgment action under the Hatch-Waxman Act and

character of the article, this cannot be done, by fixing to it, or to the package
wherein on or more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice.”).
79
Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
80
Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[N]otice
from someone closely associated with the patentee does not satisfy § 287(a).”).
81
SRI Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 127 F.3d 1462, 1469–70 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(Actual notice may be achieved “when the recipient is informed of the identity
of the patent.”).
82
Id. at 1470 (“Actual notice may be achieved without creating a case of actual
controversy in terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2201.”).
83
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380–81 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
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the Orange Book in particular. 84 However, at least one Federal Circuit
judge has hinted that the new declaratory judgment standard is too low. 85

II. CAN THE “ORANGE BOOK” SATISFY THE “NOTICE
REQUIREMENT” FOR WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT?
¶38
In a case of first impression, the Southern District of New York
in Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc. 86 decided online
pharmacies were entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that the
Orange Book did not constitute statutory notice of patent infringement
under § 287(a). 87 Because the patent owner did not mark its product
with the patent number and the patent already expired at the time the
lawsuit was filed, the patent owner could not recover pre-filing
damages 88 without the Orange Book theory of notice. After the court’s
summary judgment order limiting the damages available to plaintiff to
the filing date of the complaint, and presumably directly resulting from
that order, the case was soon dismissed pending settlement. 89
¶39
Significantly, it was not argued in Merck, and thereby left for
another day, another court and other litigants, whether the Orange Book
might constitute notice sufficient to trigger willful infringement if
coupled with at least a showing of objective recklessness. The question
is especially intriguing given a pharmaceutical company’s “obligation” 90
to consult the Orange Book before selling or offering for sale medication
regulated by the FDA. This Section summarizes relevant aspects of the
Hatch-Waxman Act and makes some observations about the Merck
decision and this novel theory of willfulness.

84

Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartix Pharms. Corp., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380–81
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
85
SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1384 (Bryson, J., concurring) (“[V]irtually any invitation
to take a paid license relating to the prospective licensee’s activities would give
rise to an Article III case or controversy if the prospective licensee elects to
assert that its conduct does not fall within the scope of the patent.”).
86
434 F. Supp. 2d 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
87
Id. at 265.
88
Id. at 264.
89
On February 21, 2007, one month after the trial court’s ruling that the patent
owner could not recover pre-filing damages, the court entered an order granting
the parties’ stipulated dismissal with prejudice.
90
Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A]
generic company has an obligation to consult the Orange Book.”).
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A. An Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 91
commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, 92 allows for FDA approval
of generic drugs according to a statutory procedure that is much faster
and less expensive than the FDA-approval process the original innovator
of the drug followed before introducing its patented medication or
method to the consumer market. The Hatch-Waxman Act attempts to
balance the interests of generic-drug manufacturers and the innovator
companies whose pioneering drugs are subject to patent protection. 93 To
a large extent, the Hatch-Waxman Act succeeded in striking the difficult
balance between inducing “name-brand pharmaceutical firms to make
the investments necessary to research and develop new drug products,
while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic
copies of those drugs to the market.” 94
¶40

¶41
Thus, the Hatch-Waxman Act gave something to both generic
companies and brand-name companies.
Streamlined guidelines
simplified the FDA-approval process for generic drugs, while lower
jurisdictional requirements allowed a patent owner to bring a declaratory
judgment action for a declaration of infringement and validity of its
patents, as shown below. Offsetting the generic company’s relatively
speedier process through the FDA, the research-based drug company (a
“pioneer” or “innovator”) is compensated for the protracted FDA-

91

Congress passed the Act as an amendment to the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355).
92
Joel Graham, The Legality of Hatch Waxman Pharmaceutical Settlements: Is
the Terazosin Test the Proper Prescription?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 429, 429 n.2
(2006) (“This Act is typically referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act because of
the congressional sponsors, Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Henry
Waxman.”) (citation omitted).
93
See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations; Patent Exclusivity
Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 50338 (Oct. 3, 1994) (“Congress intended these
provisions to provide a careful balance between promoting competition among
brand-name and duplicate or ‘generic’ drugs and encouraging research and
innovation.”).
94
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 192
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer,
Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Congress struck a balance between
two competing policy interests: (1) inducing pioneering research and
development of new drugs and (2) enabling competitors to bring low-cost,
generic copies of those drugs to market.”).
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approval process by a patent-term extension of up to five years of patent
exclusivity. 95
¶42
Owing to the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic companies may begin
developing their drugs notwithstanding the drug innovator’s patent
protection. 96 Before the Hatch-Waxman Act became law, these same
activities amounted to patent infringement because they constituted a
“use” of the patented composition or method. 97

By allowing generic companies to use the patented invention to
develop a generic alternative to the patented drug, these generic
companies gained advantages to entry into the marketplace in at least
two respects. First, generic companies may offer their generic drugs as
soon as the patent expires 98 because they would be allowed to use the
patented drug or method during the patent term to develop their own
generic counterpart. Second, the generic companies may challenge the
validity of the patent, or otherwise compete during the patent term, by
seeking FDA approval to market non-infringing alternatives via
procedural mechanisms. 99 Both benefits stem from the companies’
qualified use of a patent owner’s claimed invention.
¶43

¶44
Turning now to relevant procedure under the Hatch-Waxman
Act, the generic-drug companies are relieved from submitting the
extensive drug safety and efficacy data necessary for FDA approval.
Instead of the rigorous process required of a pioneer-drug innovator in its
New Drug Application (“NDA”), the generic-drug company only needs
to file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) that merely
relies on the drug innovator’s NDA data, without authorization,
permission, or payment to the drug innovator for the use of its data. 100
Under this procedure, generic-drug applicants avoid the tremendous time
and capital outlay to obtain the safety and efficacy data necessary for
95

Ashlee B. Mehl, The Hatch-Waxman Act and Market Exclusivity for Generic
Drug Manufacturers: An Entitlement or an Incentive?, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
649, 653 (2006); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 670
(1990); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th
Cir. 2003).
96
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
97
Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(“It is well-established, in particular, that the use of a patented invention,
without either manufacture or sale, is actionable.”) (emphasis in original).
98
See Mehl, supra note 95, at 650 (“This allows the generic firm to market its
product immediately, driving down drug prices for consumers earlier than
otherwise would have been possible.”).
99
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
100
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
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FDA approval. As a result, the ANDA procedure allows the genericdrug applicant to move swiftly through the FDA-approval process either
by not challenging the patent issued to the drug innovator or,
alternatively, by challenging the patent on grounds the patent is either
invalid or would not be infringed, commonly referred to as a Paragraph
IV certification. 101
¶45
If the generic-drug manufacturer files a Paragraph IV
certification asserting that the patent is invalid or not infringed, the
ANDA applicant must notify the patent owner. 102 Although the generic
drug is not yet on the market at this time (indeed, it still needs FDA
approval), the filing of a Paragraph IV certification constitutes an act of
infringement upon which the patent owner has forty-five days 103 to file a
federal lawsuit to adjudicate whether the generic-drug manufacturer
infringes any valid patent claim. 104 If the patent owner elects to sue, then
there is an automatic thirty-month stay of the FDA’s examination of the
generic-drug company’s ANDA while the patent litigation proceeds. 105
¶46
The Orange Book was born out of the ANDA process of the
Hatch-Waxman Act. Officially entitled the “Approved Drug Products
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,” the Orange Book identifies
(1) drug products approved by the FDA, (2) therapeutic equivalence
evaluations for multi-source prescription-drug products, and (3) patent
information concerning the listed drugs. To further the ANDA statutory
scheme, the innovator-drug company seeking FDA approval must file
information concerning each of its patents claiming a drug or a method
of using a drug subject to the patent owner’s NDA. 106

Under the mandate of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Orange Book
is published by the FDA in furtherance of the ANDA process for the
generic-drug company to review before seeking approval to manufacture,
use, sell, or offer for sale FDA-approved drugs protected by the NDA’s

¶47

101

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B).
103
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
104
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2); Organon, Inc. v. Teva Pharm., Inc., 244 F. Supp.
2d 370, 374 (D.N.J. 2002) (“In order to allow courts to determine in advance
whether the sale of a generic will infringe the patent listed in the Orange Book,
§ 271(e)(2) makes the filing of a paragraph IV certification automatically ‘an act
of infringement.’ This allows courts to peer into the future at the likelihood of
infringement once the generic is on the market, without a ripeness deficiency.”).
105
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
106
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53.
102
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patent protection. 107 Moreover, the information submitted by the NDA
(providing notice of the patent and covered products) is included in the
Orange Book where ANDA applicants should look—indeed, must
look—when seeking FDA approval for generic copies of FDA-approved
drugs.
In this context, the Federal Circuit has recognized that, in at least
two respects, the listings in the Orange Book serve the competing
interests of generic and brand-name manufacturers as Congress intended
when implementing the Hatch-Waxman Act. First, the Orange Book
provides “a streamlined mechanism for identifying and resolving patent
issues related to the proposed generic products.” 108 Second, the Orange
Book facilitates “judicial resolution of the question whether the generic
drug would infringe a pertinent patent.” 109
¶48

B. A Novel Theory of Notice via the Orange Book
Can the patent listings in the Orange Book satisfy the notice
requirement under § 287(a)? 110 Can the Orange Book serve as notice to
the accused infringer for purposes of willfulness? 111
¶49

Until recently, no reported decision addressed the issue of
whether a plaintiff can point to the Orange Book to satisfy § 287(a)
notice. Moreover, there is still no reported decision on the issue of
whether a defendant who reviews the Orange Book before engaging in
commercial activity—or deliberately fails to determine the extent of its
obligations under the Orange Book—is on notice of infringement
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the “objectively reckless”
standard of willfulness. The Federal Circuit has not addressed either
scenario.
¶50

107

See Food and Drug Administration Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, Preface to
Twenty Seventh Edition at v, http://www.fda.gov/cder/orange/obannual.pdf
(last visited October 4, 2007) (“The 1984 Amendments required the Agency to
begin publishing an up-to-date list of all marketed drug products, OTC as well
as prescription, that have been approved for safety and efficacy and for which
new drug applications are required.”). The Electronic Orange Book is available
at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm (last visited October 4, 2007).
108
Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
109
Id.
110
See supra Part I.C (discussing the type of notice required to give rise to
actual infringement damages).
111
See supra Part I.B (discussing the type of notice required to give rise to a
defendant’s duty to avoid willful infringement).
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1. Does the Orange Book Provide Notice Under
§ 287(a)?
¶51
The first decision to address § 287(a) and the Orange Book is
Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc. from the Southern
District of New York. 112
Canadian defendants operated online
pharmacies offering generic versions of the plaintiffs’ popular
cholesterol-lowering medication Zocor®. The plaintiffs did not mark
their Zocor® pills with any indication of the patents protecting the
composition and methods of making the active ingredient.
In
compliance with the Hatch-Waxman Act, however, the plaintiffs listed
the patent in the FDA’s Orange Book. The defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment asserting that, because Merck failed to mark its own
Zocor® pills and failed to give actual notice of patent infringement,
Merck should be prohibited from recovering any damages accrued before
filing the patent infringement complaint.
¶52
Initially, the district court addressed the issue of whether
marking is required for patents with both method claims and apparatus
claims. The court noted the split of authority in a combined method and
product patent. According to the plaintiffs in Merck, the marking statute
only applies where a tangible item exists for marking and the patent
owner asserts both the product and method claims of the same patent. In
other words, the plaintiffs in Merck argued they could elect to assert only
the method of use claim for the patent in suit, in which case Federal
Circuit precedent did not require marking because there would be
nothing physical to mark in a “process” or “method” claim.
¶53
In distinguishing the ruling in the Federal Circuit decision in
Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc. that “the notice requirement . . .
does not apply where the patent is directed to a process,” 113 the district
court found the Hanson rule to be a narrow holding limited to the
liability phase and not damages. 114 The plaintiffs also relied on the
Federal Circuit’s decision in American Medical Systems, Inc. v. Medical
Engineering Corp. 115 requiring marking only where “both apparatus and
method claims of the . . . patent were asserted.” 116 The district court
disagreed with the conclusion of other courts interpreting American
Medical Systems to excuse marking where only the method claims were

112

434 F. Supp. 2d 257 (2006).
718 F.2d 1075, 1083 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
114
Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 257, 262
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
115
6 F.3d 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
116
Id. at 1538–39.
113
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asserted, and instead found that the marking statute must be followed
when a tangible article is “capable” of being marked, even when a
plaintiff elects to assert only the method claims of a mixed compositionmethod patent. 117
¶54
Having found the patent-marking statute applied to the patents in
suit, the district court acknowledged the issue of whether the Orange
Book satisfied the marking statute as “one of first impression.” 118 The
district court found the Orange Book not to be the type of “affirmative
communication of a specific charge of infringement by a specified
accused product” 119 as the district court interpreted Federal Circuit
precedent. 120

But the Merck decision is only persuasive precedent, because the
Federal Circuit has not decided the issue of whether (and to what extent)
a plaintiff may rely on the Orange Book to satisfy the marking statute.
Furthermore, there was no evidence that the defendants in Merck had
notice of the patent from the Orange Book listing, because the defendants
did not file an ANDA or a Paragraph IV certification.

¶55

2. Does the Orange Book Provide Notice for Proving
Willfulness?
The explosion of ANDA suits signals an intensified struggle
over the high-stakes prize of market exclusivity in the brand-name versus
generic drug war. When one additional month of exclusivity can
significantly impact a company’s revenue stream, as it sometimes can,
then the need to optimize the term of exclusivity will transform the rules
of engagement under Hatch-Waxman and patent litigation. Indeed, drug
innovators face escalating competition from Canadian manufacturers of
generic drugs, online drug companies, and retail giants such as WalMart® Super Centers filling prescriptions for four dollars with generic
drugs. With so many competitors turning a piece of the generic
prescription drug business, drug innovators must turn to their patent
counsel in hopes of boosting patent damages to make up for any shortfall
in customer traffic and sales of their drugs.

¶56

¶57
More precisely, the need for attorneys representing owners of
pharmaceutical patents to innovate and quickly respond to client
demands is greater than ever. With brand-name clients becoming
117

Merck, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 262–63.
Id. at 264.
119
Id. at 263 (emphasis in original) (citing Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel
Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
120
In addition to the Amsted decision, the Merck court relied on SRI Int’l, Inc. v.
Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
118
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increasingly concerned about diminishing returns, the expensive nature
of drug development, and spiraling costs of litigation, their attorneys
need to be creative with their damages theories in order to maximize
recovery and help their clients recoup the investments in research and
development necessary to bring new and innovative drugs to the
marketplace, which investments of time and money have been estimated
to reach twelve years 121 and $800 million, 122 respectively. This article
suggests a novel theory of willful infringement in order for a patent
owner to recover treble damages and attorneys’ fees.
¶58
Toward that end, the decision in Merck gives fodder for the
argument that the Orange Book provides notice sufficient to trigger
willfulness where there is infringing commercial activity. This is
especially true when Merck is read in conjunction with the Federal
Circuit’s 2004 decision in Knorr-Bremse reaffirming an affirmative duty
“to avoid infringement of the known patent rights of others” 123 and the
Federal Circuit’s rebuke of “when widespread disregard of patent rights
was undermining the national innovation incentive.” 124
¶59
In conceding that the Orange Book “informs the public of the
patent’s existence,” 125 the Merck decision arguably allows a finding of
willfulness based on a defendant’s notice of a patent via the Orange
Book. Moreover, the district court in Merck noted the contention that the
Orange Book gives “notice to an audience that is required by statute to
seek out and heed that notice,” the “defendants were required to consult
the Orange Book under the relevant statutory scheme, and had they done
so they would have received notice.” 126 Admittedly, the court found this
evidence to “focus on the defendants’ actions.” 127

121

Andrew J. Paprocki, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc.: Can
the Patent-Term Extension of the Hatch-Waxman Act Be Used as Leverage in
Drug Patent Infringement Settlements?, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 471, 474 (Summer
2006).
122
Daniel F. Couglin, Ph.D., & Rochelle A. Dede, Hatch-Waxman GamePlaying from a Generic Manufacturer Perspective: From Ticlid® to
Pravachol®, Apotex has Difficulty Telling Who’s on First, 25 BIOTECHNOLOGY
L. REP. 525, 526 n.9 (October 2006).
123
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).
124
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
125
Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 257, 264
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
126
Id.
127
Id. at 265.
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While the court granted defendants’ motion, the court did not
reach the issue of willfulness. Instead, the motion was brought under
§ 287(a), and the court held that the “defendants’ knowledge of the
patent’s existence is simply irrelevant to the notice determination” under
the marking statute. 128
¶60

¶61
Yet, the notice to the defendants in Merck is fundamental to a
determination of willful infringement 129 and the “objectively high
likelihood that its actions would constitute infringement of a valid
patent.” 130
¶62
Notice for purposes of willful infringement focuses on a
defendant’s knowledge of the patent. Also, notice is evidence that an
unjustifiably high risk of infringement, when objectively assessed, was
known or so obvious to the defendant that it should have been known.
This is true whether the defendant arrives at that knowledge by an
engineer’s memorandum or by an information disclosure statement the
defendant files in its own patent application for an invention unrelated to
the accused product. 131 Merck may be read to open the door to a plaintiff
pleading a willfulness theory that a defendant who reviews the Orange
Book is found to possess knowledge of the patent’s existence leading to
an objectively high risk of willful infringement when coupled with
infringing commercial activity.

3. Seagate Technology and the “Standards of Commerce”
Seagate Technology sent a message that “standards of behavior
by which a possible infringer evaluates adverse patents should be the
standards of fair commerce, including reasonableness of the actions
taken in the particular circumstances.” 132 If precautions by a defendant
are intentionally deficient, then courts ought to adjust accountability, not
to deny the opportunity to prove willfulness altogether.
¶63

“Willful” infringement should cover both knowing and reckless
disregard of the law. Knowing violations are sensibly understood as
¶64

128

Id.
nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
130
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
131
SRI Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(finding actual notice when defendant’s “engineers expressed their concerns”
about the patent in a memorandum); see also Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton
Sundstrand Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1037 (D. Del. 2001) (finding that a
reference in defendant’s files to the patent satisfied notice requirement for
willfulness).
132
Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1385 (Newman, J., concurring); see also id. at
1371 n.5.
129
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more serious than reckless ones. Actions falling within the “knowing”
category include a defendant’s knowing failure to comply with the
Hatch-Waxman Act 133 and intentionally violating the Act by not
consulting (or reviewing and ignoring) the Orange Book and thereby
showing an objectively high risk of infringement rather than the
defendant being “merely careless.” 134
¶65
In the recklessness category, the Federal Circuit understood that
“recklessness” is a word whose construction often depends on the
context in which it appears. A company would not be acting recklessly if
it diligently and in good faith attempted to fulfill its statutory obligations
under the Hatch-Waxman Act and simply came to an incorrect
conclusion. 135 But a deliberate and objectively reckless failure to
comply with the Hatch-Waxman Act in determining the extent of its
obligations ought not to evade liability under § 284 any more than “bad
faith infringement.” 136 Any other reading of Seagate Technology leaves
a loophole for paying mere lip-service to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the
costs of which would be too high.
¶66
Instead, courts should entertain theories enhancing
accountability rather than denying plaintiffs the tools they need to
demonstrate an objectively-defined risk (determined by the record after
discovery) and to show the risk “was either known or so obvious that it
should have been known to the accused infringer.” 137 Therefore,
recklessness might turn on circumstances showing the defendant acted in
reckless disregard of patent rights in violation of the Hatch-Waxman
Act. 138
¶67
This construction of “objective recklessness” comports with
common law usage endorsed by the Federal Circuit in Seagate
133

Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2208 (2007) (“[W]here
willfulness is a statutory condition of civil liability, we have generally taken it to
cover not only knowing violations of a standard, but reckless ones as well.”)
134
Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1384 (Gajarsa, J., concurring); see also id. at 1381
(Supreme Court cases “do not hold that a finding of willfulness is necessary to
support an award of enhanced damages. At most, those cases merely stand for
the uncontroversial proposition that a finding of willfulness is sufficient to
support an award of enhanced damages.”) (emphasis in original).
135
Cf. Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1384 (A defendant’s actions must be “not only
incorrect, but [] objectively unreasonable.”).
136
Id. at 1368 (“[B]ad faith infringement” is “a type of willful infringement.”).
137
Id. at 1371.
138
The Federal Circuit did not set forth an absolute definition of the term
“reckless” but instead emphasized that the term would be developed by future
cases. Id. at 1371, 1385.
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Technology, which cited both Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 139 and
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 140 The Restatement, for example,
defines recklessness in terms of an actor’s conduct as “reckless
disregard” when the actor does an act or “intentionally fails” to do an act
that it is duty-bound to do, “knowing or having reason to know of facts”
that would lead a “reasonable” person to appreciate the risk as
substantially greater then simple negligence. 141
¶68
Hence, recklessness may consist of either of two different types
of conduct. In one, the actor knows or has reason to know of facts that
create a high degree of risk, but acts or fails to act “in conscious
disregard of, or indifference to, that risk.” 142 For the other type of
recklessness, the actor either knows, or has “reason to know, the facts,
but does not realize or appreciate the high degree of risk involved,”
although a reasonable person would appreciate the risk. 143
¶69
After all, when a defendant intentionally violates the HatchWaxman Act by failing to comply with its duty to check the Orange
Book (or by disregarding the results if it does check the Orange Book)
and there is a strong probability that the defendant knew or should have
known of an unreasonably high risk of infringement, then the
defendant’s conscious choice involves a risk substantially greater than
mere negligence. 144 Simply put, the defendant cannot stick its head in
139

Id. at 1371 (citing W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 34, 212-14 (5th ed. 1984)).
140

Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d at 1371 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 500 (1965)).
141
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 500 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
SECOND]; see also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 34, 213 (5th ed. 1984)) [hereinafter PROSSER]
(permitting recklessness to be found when there is evidence of “a known or
obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that the harm would
follow”).
142
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 500 cmt. A (1965).
143
Id. An objective standard is applied to this second type of recklessness, and
the actor is “held to the realization of the aggravated risk.” Id.
144
The American Law Institute has approved the proposed final draft (issued on
April 6, 2006) of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (2007) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT THIRD]. Unlike § 500 of the RESTATEMENT SECOND cited by the
Federal Circuit in Seagate, supra notes 140–141, which does not require the
actor’s actual knowledge of the risks (instead, requiring at least actual
knowledge of facts leading a reasonable person to realize the risks), Section 2 of
the RESTATEMENT THIRD defines “recklessness” to require knowledge of facts
making the risk of infringement “obvious” to a person or business subject to the
Hatch-Waxman Act:
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the sand, and then walk away from all accountability. The result would
undermine the public’s confidence in the Hatch-Waxman Act and would
do little to enhance the public image of the patent system as a whole.

III. SYNTHESIS OF WILLFUL PATENT INFRINGEMENT UNDER THE
NOVEL ORANGE BOOK NOTICE THEORY
¶70
It is common advice to check under the hood before buying a
used car. Asserting a pharmaceutical patent should be no different,
although practitioners overlooked the advantages of using the Orange
Book and the ANDA process to establish a theory of willfulness. This
section looks under the hood by exploring how the novel Orange Book
theory of proving willfulness will work in practice.

A. The Orange Book Theory and Hatch-Waxman Act
¶71
Since 2004, there is a split of authority concerning willful patent
infringement in the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 145 This chasm
will grow until it reaches the Federal Circuit, thereby making the novel
Orange Book theory quite timely.
¶72
Plainly stated, the “mere” filing of an ANDA does not—taken
alone—constitute grounds for finding willful infringement. Indeed, this
was the 2004 Federal Circuit holding in Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex,
Inc.: “[W]e now hold that the mere fact that a company has filed an

A person acts recklessly in engaging in conduct if:
(a) the person knows of the risk of harm created by the conduct or knows facts
that make the risk obvious to another in the person’s situation, and
(b) the precaution that would eliminate or reduce the risk involves burdens that
are so slight relative to the magnitude of the risk as to render the person’s
failure to adopt the precaution a demonstration of the person’s indifference to
the risk.
RESTATEMENT THIRD, § 2. Therefore, both the Second and Third Restatements
support the “Orange Book” theory of willful patent infringement asserted by this
article.
145
Celgene Corp. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 439 (D.N.J. 2006)
(“District courts that have addressed the issue have disagreed as to whether or
not there can be a finding of willful infringement based upon the filing of an
ANDA and Paragraph IV Certification.”); Boehringer Ingelheim Int’l GMBH v.
Barr Labs., Inc., No. 05-700, 2006 WL 1876918, at *2 (D. Del. July 6, 2006)
(“The district courts have split on the issue.”); Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 05-1887, 2005 WL 3664014, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 30,
2005) (Although “Glaxo stands for the proposition that an ANDA filing, without
more, does not constitute willful infringement, it is possible that Novartis may
be able to show activity in addition to the ANDA filing to support the issue of
willfulness.”).
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ANDA application or certification cannot support a finding of willful
infringement for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(4).” 146 Since this ruling, the Federal Circuit has not
expounded further on Glaxo or the intersection between willfulness and
the Hatch-Waxman Act. 147
¶73
A fair reading of Glaxo, however, is that the Federal Circuit
simply recognized the fact that there was no patent infringement by the
“mere” 148 filing of an ANDA or Paragraph IV certification. For this
reason, the Supreme Court earlier emphasized that patent litigation
initiated in federal courts under §§ 271(e)(2) and (e)(4) constitutes
“highly artificial” acts of infringement simply as a vehicle to serve the
“very limited and technical purpose” of creating jurisdiction under the
fiction of an act of infringement (i.e., “to enable the judicial adjudication
upon which the ANDA and paper NDA schemes depend”). 149 The
Glaxo court acknowledged that § 271(e) of the Patent Act was “primarily
a jurisdictional-conferring statute that establishes a case or controversy in
a declaratory judgment action.” 150 In fact, the Federal Circuit recently
made it easier to file declaratory judgment actions in ANDA cases, 151
146

376 F.3d 1339, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Since handing down Glaxo, the Federal Circuit has only cited to that decision
on three occasions. In all three cases, Glaxo was cited for its discussion of
patent invalidity in general, and in particular the high burden of proving
invalidity based on prior art references that were before the examiner during
prosecution. Haberman v. Gerber Prods. Co., Nos. 2006–1490 & 1516, 2007
WL 1577970, at *4 (Fed. Cir. May 29, 2007) (not selected for publication);
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
148
Glaxo, 376 F.3d at 1350–51.
149
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 674–78 (1990); see also
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartix Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1334 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (“Teva’s paragraph IV certifications constitute technical infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).”).
150
Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
151
Teva, 482 F.3d at 1340–45; see also SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics,
Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In lowering the standard for patent
declaratory judgment actions, both Teva and SanDisk relied on footnote 11 from
the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct.
764, 774 n.11 (2007). See Teva, 482 F.3d at 1339 (“In MedImmune, the
Supreme Court in a detailed footnote stated that our two-prong ‘reasonable
apprehension of suit’ test ‘conflicts’ and would ‘contradict’ several cases in
which the Supreme Court found that a declaratory judgment plaintiff had a
justiciable controversy.”); SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1379; see also SanDisk, 482
F.3d at 1384 (Bryson, J., concurring) (“The decision in MedImmune dealt with a
narrow issue. . . . Footnote 11 of the MedImmune opinion, however, went further
147

29

2007

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 6

and by doing so, expressly recognized that the listing of patents “in the
Orange Book . . . represents that a claim of patent infringement could
reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged in
the manufacture, use or sale of generic [drugs] covered by the claims of
its listed [drug] patents.” 152
¶74
Notwithstanding its “mere” filing holding, the Glaxo court
recognized that, even in cases initiated solely based on the defendant’s
filing of an ANDA or Paragraph IV certification, a district court may
declare the case “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285. 153 Section 285
permits an award to the patent owner of its attorneys’ fees resulting from
“litigation misconduct such as vexatious or unjustified litigation or
frivolous filings, and willful infringement.” 154 Thus, even under Glaxo,
district courts may consider willfulness, provided the allegation does not
rest solely on the filing of an ANDA or Paragraph IV certification, such
as in determining whether to award attorneys’ fees. 155 In assessing
whether a case is exceptional for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees, a
court “must look at the totality of the circumstances.” 156
¶75
The Glaxo court also left open the possibility that filing an
ANDA in combination with other factors should allow a brand-name
drug manufacturer to plead both willful infringement as well as

and criticized this court’s ‘reasonable apprehension of suit’ test for declaratory
judgment jurisdiction.”).
152
Teva, 482 F.3d at 1341.
153
Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1350 Fed. Cir. 2004).
154
Id. (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit in Glaxo emphasized that a
declaratory judgment action alleging anticipatory infringement based on an
ANDA was an “artificial” infringement for purposes of establishing jurisdiction:
Because 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) is designed to create an artificial act of
infringement for purposes of establishing jurisdiction in the federal courts, we
hold that the district court committed clear legal error in finding that Apotex’s
mere filing of an ANDA could form the basis of a willful infringement finding
. . . [S]uch a filing cannot constitute willful infringement for purposes of
establishing an exceptional case and the award of attorney’s fees under 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(4).
Glaxo, 376 F.3d at 1351 (emphasis in original).
155
Glaxo, 376 F.3d at 1350–51.
156
Yamanouchi Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339,
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming a district court’s finding that the case was
“exceptional” based on an ANDA filing that was “without adequate foundation
and speculative at best”). The defendant had failed to present a prima facie case
of invalidity in filing its Paragraph IV certification, and proceeded with
litigation despite “glaring weaknesses” in its case. Id. at 1347–48; see also
supra Part I.A (discussing the factors for determining willful infringement).
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attorneys’ fees. On the one hand, the Federal Circuit arguably foreclosed
a finding of willful infringement when based “merely” on the filing of
the ANDA. 157 On the other hand, a patent owner should have the
opportunity to establish facts supporting a claim that the “only” act of
infringement alleged in the complaint is not simply the defendant’s mere
filing of an ANDA.
For example, Glaxo arguably recognizes that a claim for willful
infringement may be pleaded “when commercial activity has actually
occurred in the United States or when the commercial product has been
imported.” 158 Indeed, it would turn Hatch-Waxman on its head to permit
a defendant to file an ANDA and engage in pre-filing or post-filing
“commercial activity” or importing a “commercial product” with
impunity.
¶76

Just how much commercial activity is necessary or when a
commercial product is deemed imported remains an open issue. Will it
be enough to “copy” the patentee’s drug or combine an ANDA with one
or more of the nine factors considered under the “totality of
circumstances”? 159 Will it be enough to promote a generic version on
the defendant’s website? 160 An intriguing Pandora’s box opened by the
Federal Circuit’s highly publicized decision in NTP, Inc. v. Research in
Motion, Ltd., 161 is the extraterritorial reach of the Patent Act. 162 In NTP,
¶77

157

Glaxo, 376 F.3d at 1350–51.
Id. at 1350.
159
Deliberate copying is one of the nine factors considered under the “totality of
circumstances.” Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1225
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
160
Borrowing from the context of § 287(a), a website is arguably a “tangible”
item. Soverain Software L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 2d 904, 909
(E.D. Tex. 2005) (“[T]he Court . . . defines ‘tangible item[s],’ as used in
Am[erican] Medical Systems, as those items that can be marked and intangible
items as those that cannot be marked.” Applying that definition, the court found
screen shots of a website to be a tangible item.) (citing Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v.
Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538–39 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
161
418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1174 (2006).
162
Commentators debate whether there may ever be extraterritorial enforcement
of intellectual property laws under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Compare John
W. Osborne, A Rational Analytical Boundary for Determination of Infringement
by Extraterritorially-Distributed Systems, 46 IDEA 587 (2006) (arguing that,
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), (f), (g) (2000), a foreign defendant of an
extraterritorially-distributed telecommunications system cannot infringe the
patent if its activities relating to the patentably distinctive aspect of the claimed
invention did not take place in the United States) with Christopher A. Harkins,
Overcoming the Extraterritorial Bar to Bringing Copyright Actions: On
158
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the Federal Circuit applied § 271(a) to accused products and systems
distributed extraterritorially by focusing on the “place at which the
system as a whole is put into service,” the “place where control of the
system is exercised,” and the place where “beneficial use of the system
[is] obtained.” 163 According to the court, the fact that one element of the
system claims took place “in Canada did not, as a matter of law, preclude
infringement of the asserted system claims” by Research in Motion. 164
¶78
Patent attorneys have sat by idly when merely asserting a
defendant’s ANDA or Paragraph IV certification as a basis for
jurisdiction and the limited relief under § 271(e). In a case where there is
commercial activity or a commercial product, however, the patent
owner’s willful infringement claim no longer rests entirely on the “mere
filing” 165 of an ANDA. The defendant’s knowledge of the asserted
patent, whether from the Orange Book or otherwise, and a showing that
its actions constitute “objective recklessness,” 166 are relevant to the
totality of circumstances and to the time-honored duty to avoid willful
infringement.

B. The Orange Book Theory and Traditional Infringement
¶79
The Glaxo decision seems to have set many in the patent
community buzzing about a perceived deathblow to willful infringement
pharmaceutical litigation. But there is a different way of looking at the
Glaxo decision: The Federal Circuit was simply recognizing the “highly
artificial” act of infringement as a necessary requirement for satisfying
justiciability when the generic companies “have not yet infringed the
patents in issue.” 167
¶80
Once defendants have committed at least one primary act of
patent infringement, however, then the Glaxo decision ought not apply.
In other words, a claim for willful infringement should be actionable

Pleading Copyright Infringement to Protect Copyrighted Works from the
Defendant that Ships Overseas for Distribution Abroad, 17 INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. L.J. 1, 7 (May 2005) (noting the extraterritorial bar to bringing copyright
infringement suits but arguing for an exception to that rule, because “[w]hen
defendants have committed at least one primary act of copyright infringement in
the United States, the presumption against extraterritoriality ought not to defeat
a court’s subject matter jurisdiction”).
163
NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317.
164
Id.
165
Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1342, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
166
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
167
Glaxo, 376 F.3d at 1351 (emphasis added).
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under the Patent Act and Federal Circuit precedent, if the willfulness
claim is not based solely on defendants’ filing of an ANDA. 168 The
bottom line is: Look under the hood of that used car for evidence of
infringement. Also, a patent owner should learn to plead offensively to
rebut a future motion to dismiss a claim of willful infringement, which
facts may otherwise escape the complaint in favor of clutching to the
more habitual practice of notice pleading. 169
¶81
Consequently, a patent owner may affirmatively plead theories
of direct infringement when the defendant is offering to sell, selling, or
importing into the United States any product that embodies the patented
invention. 170 Or the patent owner may seek to hold the defendant liable
under a theory of indirect infringement, 171 such as by inducement of
infringement 172 or by contributory infringement. 173

168

The plaintiff should be allowed to develop evidence necessary to show a
primary act of infringement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (1987). Rule 56(f)
provides a non-movant with protection from being “railroaded” by a defendant’s
premature motion for summary judgment. Opryland USA, Inc. v. Great Am.
Music Show, Inc., 970 F.2d 847, 852 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
169
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), (e) (1987); see also HARKINS, supra note 162, at 4
(“Rather than abiding by that longstanding rule, fact pleading (as opposed to
federal notice pleading) should be considered. Indeed, using an appropriate
level of fact pleading in a well-pleaded complaint may dissuade motion practice
. . . as well as help to broaden the scope of allowable discovery.”).
170
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title,
whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the
patent.”).
171
The Federal Circuit uses the term “indirect infringement” to describe active
inducement of infringement or contributory infringement. DSU Med. Corp. v.
JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt,
Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Furthermore, “the patentee always has
the burden to show direct infringement for each instance of indirect
infringement.” DSU, 471 F.3d at 1303; see also Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1751 & n.2 (2007) (Without direct infringement, there
can be no inducing or contributing to an infringement.).
172
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1952) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a
patent shall be liable as an infringer.”). There can be no inducement to infringe
a patent unless the defendant “knew of the patent.” DSU, 471 F.3d at 1304.
Once the defendant “knew” of the patent, the defendant must “actively and
knowingly” aid and abet another’s direct infringement—knowledge of another’s
acts (alleged to be infringing the patent) is not enough to show “specific intent
and action to induce infringement.” Id. at 1305 (emphasis in original). The
defendant’s state of mind must show the defendant “knowingly induced
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For example, the first decision expressly dealing with marking in
the context of the Orange Book was Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health
Consulting, Inc. 174 In Merck, defendants operated Canadian-based
Internet pharmacies, promoted their products in the United States via
their websites, and sold, offered for sale, or promoted generic versions of
plaintiff’s patented drug to defendants’ customers in the United States
through the Internet. 175 Furthermore, all of the defendants knowingly
sold and advertised the accused generic drugs in the United States
without FDA approval. 176
¶82

¶83
Under those circumstances, the defendants arguably can be said
to commit at least one primary act of patent infringement. 177
Consequently, they should not be allowed to rely on the Hatch-Waxman
Act, which limits a plaintiff’s remedy to declaratory relief, to avoid
damages stemming from patent infringement liability. Plainly stated,

infringement, not merely knowingly induced the acts that constitute direct
infringement.” Id. at 1306 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). In other
words, “the inducer must have an affirmative intent to cause direct
infringement.” Id.; see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005).
173
The statutory source for contributory infringement is § 271(c):
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the
United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination
or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented
process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be
especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006); see also DSU, 471 F.3d at 1303 (Contributory
infringement requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant made or sold the
accused product, that no substantial non-infringing uses existed, that the
defendant’s acts of contributory infringement occurred within the United States,
and that an act of direct infringement was made within the United States.);
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932 (2005)
(stating that one who sells articles for use in a patented combination will be
“presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts; he will be presumed to
intend that they shall be used in the combination of the patent”).
174
434 F. Supp. 2d 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
175
Id. at 260.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 266 (“Accordingly, defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment
is granted only with respect to any claims for injunctive relief and damages
resulting from purported infringement following patent expiration.”); see also
id. at 263 n.5 (acknowledging the plaintiffs’ allegations of patent infringement
based on product and method claims).
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defendants who have not complied with the Hatch-Waxman Act should
not benefit from it. Conversely, if defendants complied with US law and
filed an ANDA before selling or promoting drugs in the US during the
term of the asserted patent, then Merck might be limited to declaratory
relief under Hatch-Waxman. The defendants in that scenario, however,
were not selling infringing products and the issue of damages and a claim
of willful infringement would never arise.
Moreover, there is an “obligation” 178 to consult the Orange Book
before promoting, selling, or offering for sale generic medication
regulated by the FDA. Use of a patented invention constitutes
infringement, and knowledge of the patent triggers a duty to avoid
directly and indirectly infringing the claims of the patent. 179 And as a
practical matter, sellers of generic versions of brand-name drugs can
hardly dispute they were unaware of the plaintiff’s product—after all,
their business models encourage Americans to save money on
prescriptions by switching from the more costly brand-name drugs to
their more affordable generic drugs. In most cases, defendants
acknowledge on their websites that their products are equivalent, safe,
and as effective as the brand-name drug. 180
¶84

Consequently, once a defendant has committed a primary act of
infringement in the prescription-drug arena, the patent owner should be
¶85

178

Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“[A] generic company has an obligation to consult the Orange Book”).
179
See supra Part I.A and II.B.3 (Discussing case law holding that patent
infringement is a strict liability offense and that the accused infringer has a duty
to investigate and avoid willful infringement); see also supra notes 171–74
(discussing case law relating to indirect infringement theories such as
inducement of infringement and contributory infringement).
180
If an ANDA were filed, then the generic-drug company’s offers represent
therapeutic equivalence under the Hatch-Waxman Act and relies on the new
drug applicant’s full reports demonstrating safety and effectiveness. 21 U.S.C.
§ 505 (2006). Even when a generic-drug company sells without filing an
ANDA, as in Merck, the company is likely to boast equivalence to, without the
price of, brand-name pharmaceuticals. Indeed, in Merck & Co. v. Mediplan
Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), a companion
opinion to the Merck decision discussed above but relating to the allegations of
unfair competition, the district court described how the defendants’ websites
offered generic versions of plaintiff’s popular cholesterol medication, Zocor,
and did so “to identify their products as more affordable generic versions of
Zocor,” id. at 406, advertised as “safe affordable” alternatives, id. at 407, and
used Merck’s Zocor work mark in connection with their advertisements, id. at
408–09.
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allowed to assert a claim for willful infringement 181 and to pursue that
theory in discovery. 182 Otherwise, there is a highly irregular disconnect
whereby defendants may eschew both the FDA and patent laws on the
one hand, and attempt to shield from discovery evidence of blatant
copying and intentional disregard for the patent on the other. Such a
result would undercut the policy of the Patent Act that patents constitute
rights of exclusivity, 183 that there be a “remedy by civil action for
infringement” of a patent, 184 and that the patent owner be awarded
damages adequate to compensate the owner for the infringement, but in
no event less than a reasonable royalty, treble damages, 185 and attorneys’
fees if the case is exceptional. 186
¶86
Therefore, when a potential plaintiff performs the necessary prefiling investigation 187 of the would-be defendant’s commercial activities
and commercial product before bringing a claim for patent infringement,
181

In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(“However, when a complaint is filed, a patentee must have a good faith basis
for alleging willful infringement. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8, 11(b). So a willfulness
claim asserted in the original complaint must necessarily be grounded
exclusively in the accused infringer’s pre-filing conduct.”).
182
As antecedent to the issue of willfulness before it, a court may consider
allowing a plaintiff discovery relating to willful infringement. Seagate Tech.,
497 F.3d 1371–72 (“The ultimate dispute in this case is the proper scope of
discovery. While it is true that the issue of willful infringement, or even
infringement for that matter, has not been decided by the trial court, it is
indisputable that the proper legal standard for willful infringement informs the
relevance of evidence relating to that issue and, more importantly here, the
proper scope of discovery.”).
183
35 U.S.C. 154 (2006) (Every patent shall grant to the patentee the “right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United
States.”); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (“patents shall have attributes of personal
property”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“[S]ecuring for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their Respective Writings and
Discoveries.”).
184
35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006).
185
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three
times the amount found or assessed.”).
186
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (“The court in exceptional cases may award
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”).
187
View Eng’g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d 981, 986 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“In bringing a claim for infringement, the patent holder, if challenged,
must be prepared to demonstrate to both the court and the alleged infringer
exactly why it believed before filing the claim that it had a reasonable chance of
proving infringement.”).
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consider drafting the complaint with an eye toward the nine nonexclusive factors that make up the “totality of the circumstances” 188 for
proving willful infringement. After all, the Federal Circuit considers
willfulness to be one of degree: “Willfulness in infringement, as in life, is
not an all-or-nothing trait, but one of degree. It recognizes that
infringement may range from unknowing, or accidental, to deliberate, or
reckless, disregard of a patentee’s legal rights.” 189
¶87
Patent infringement is a strict-liability action requiring no intent
or wrongdoing on the part of the defendant, 190 but an act of infringement
rarely exists in a vacuum. When coupled with just one of the nine
factors, perhaps a plaintiff might not be alerted to willfulness. When a
potential plaintiff can show two factors in addition to the infringement, a
warning flag should be raised in the plaintiff’s mind. And when there are
three or more factors, the flag should start waving back and forth.
¶88
However, one never reaches the totality of circumstances,
objective recklessness, and ultimately willfulness without showing the
defendant had notice of the patent. 191 Why settle on the date when the
patent infringement complaint was filed? At the very least, give thought
to bringing the date back to when the defendant first possessed actual
knowledge of the asserted patent—the date when, according to its legal
obligation or business practice, the defendant checked the Orange Book.
When the dust settles, the Orange Book might very well entitle the patent
owner to damages from the inception of the defendant’s infringing
activities.

CONCLUSION
¶89
The debate about willful infringement under the Hatch-Waxman
Act is represented by strong advocacy on opposing sides. 192 One side

188

See supra text accompanying notes 28–29 (Listing nine factors that comprise
the totality of circumstances; see also Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(en banc) (“Determination of willfulness is made on consideration of the totality
of the circumstances, and may include contributions of several factors . . . .
These contributions are evaluated and weighed by the trier of fact.”) (citations
omitted).
189
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343.
190
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc);
Hilton Davis Chem Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc).
191
See supra Part I.B and notes 56–71 (discussing cases addressing the types of
notice necessary and sufficient to create a duty to avoid willful infringement).
192
See supra Part II.A and note 94.
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sets the bar very high, such that willfulness damages are never available.
These advocates claim the Hatch-Waxman policy in favor of cheaper,
generic copies of drugs should carry the day.
Brand-name
manufacturers, on the other side, warn that an absolute bar against
willfulness damages will stymie research. They would call for
willfulness damages in order to promote the Hatch-Waxman policy
encouraging new drug development. This article seeks a carefully
crafted balance by focusing on the public interest that lies somewhere
between those two equally important sides.
¶90
Accordingly, in the high stakes of brand-name versus genericdrug litigation, plaintiffs bringing patent infringement actions can be
expected to start testing the theory of whether (and to what extent) the
Orange Book provides “notice” of the asserted patents. First, plaintiffs
may argue the Orange Book fully serves the purpose of notifying
potential infringers that the would-be defendants’ generic drugs will
infringe the listed patents for purpose of the notice requirements under
§ 287(a).

Second, the Merck 193 case—and its nascent theory of asserting
“notice” based on the Orange Book—has a potentially far-reaching
impact on willful infringement. Future plaintiffs might develop a theory
of willful infringement by arguing the Orange Book provides direct and
specific notice to a unique audience required by statute to seek out and
heed the notice that generic drugs will infringe the patents listed within.
Consequently, defendants who consult the Orange Book would be under
a duty to avoid infringing a patent relevant to their products. If the
defendants are found to have willfully failed to comply with (or to be in
reckless disregard of) this duty and “standards of commerce,” 194 there
may be a determination of willful infringement and a finding that they
owe treble damages and attorneys’ fees.
¶91

¶92
As one contemplates these novel theories, one should not lose
sight of the price paid for innovation, which the Hatch-Waxman Act
seeks to encourage. Indeed, achievements have not always resulted in
immediate commercial success, but resulting in expensive undertakings
and long-term investments. More precisely, innovative pharmaceutical
companies may spend as much as a dozen years and $800 million to
193

Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d 257
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
194
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(In recognizing that the “objective recklessness” standard of willfulness is not
self-defining, the Federal Circuit stated: “We would expect, as suggested by
Judge Newman, that the standards of commerce would be among the factors a
court might consider.”) (internal citation omitted).
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bring a pioneering drug to the market, 195 and FDA-required testing at
times effectively reduces the life of patent protection to seven years or
less. 196 Moreover, the compromise leading to the Hatch-Waxman Act
was intended to facilitate and expedite generic-drug market entry without
harming, and indeed while concurrently safeguarding, pharmaceutical
companies bringing new and innovative drugs to the marketplace.
¶93
Only a year ago, who thought Wal-Mart would offer four dollar
prescriptions for generic drugs? Tomorrow, Wal-Mart might become the
Spacely Space Sprockets of generic-drug prescriptions. When generic
drugs fly off the shelves faster than the speed of light, brand-name
pharmaceutical companies are slowed by plunking down hefty sums in
R&D necessary to develop innovative drugs that foster the high standard
of living in America as well as to help developing countries in need of
better medicine.
¶94
To stay competitive, stimulate invention of new products, and
innovate ways to save and improve lives, pioneering drug manufacturers
must look to the courts more than ever for patent protection, injunctive
relief, and money damages that help to underwrite costly research.
Therefore, to offset the generic’s edge, a budding theory of Orange Book
notice and willfulness might well be the innovator’s diamond in the
rough.

195

See Paprocki, supra note 121, at 474; Couglin & Dede, supra note 122, at
526 n.9.
196
Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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